Qubic, a layer-1 blockchain, has stopped processing transactions after an attacker emptied more than 1,400 wallets in under two hours over the weekend. The attacker did not break the blockchain. They took advantage of wallet seeds that were never random enough to begin with. Because the network was paused quickly, most of the stolen tokens still sit on-chain. The network's validators will now vote on whether and how to hand them back.

Qubic says the theft hit wallets created on iPhones, iPads and Macs, so the users at risk are a specific and fairly large group. It also shows that you can store a key perfectly and still lose your funds if the software that generated it was weak.

What happened and how much was taken

According to Bitcoin.com News, the unauthorised transfers ran from 23:42 UTC on Saturday 17 October to 01:26 UTC on Sunday 18 October. In that window, 1,404 wallets lost about 2.94 trillion QU, Qubic's native token.

The two sources value the haul differently. Bitcoin.com puts it at $1.3 million. Cointelegraph, citing the project, says approximately $1.4 million. The token amount is the same in both reports, so the gap most likely comes from QU's price at the time each estimate was made.

Qubic's validators, which the project calls Computors, then halted the chain at tick 85,371,949. A "tick" is Qubic's unit of network time, roughly what other chains call a block height. When Cointelegraph published on 19 October, the network was still paused at that tick.

Predictable seeds, not a protocol bug

A wallet seed is the secret string that controls a wallet. Anyone who has it can move the funds. In Qubic's case the seed is 55 characters long. If it is generated with proper randomness, the number of possible seeds is far too large for anyone to guess.

These seeds were not generated with proper randomness. Bitcoin.com reports that the attacker did not have to search the full range of possibilities. They could apparently rebuild a much smaller set of likely seeds, check which matching wallets held funds, and empty them.

Qubic says the affected seeds were generated in three ways:

  • in any browser on an iPhone or iPad
  • in Safari on a Mac, up until 18 October 2026
  • in the Qubic iOS app, in versions before July 2025

Cointelegraph examined a GitHub commit for version 4.26.4 of the Qubic web wallet. It shows the developers replaced JavaScript's Math.random() function with crypto.getRandomValues() for seed creation. Math.random() produces numbers that look random enough for games or animations, but its output can be predictable, so it is not meant for secrets. crypto.getRandomValues() draws on a cryptographically secure source designed for that job.

Developers also say they moved other vulnerable funds to safety before the attacker reached them. According to Bitcoin.com, QEARN stakes were not affected.

Where the money is now

The halt left the attacker with very little they can actually spend. Qubic says 87.1% of the drained QU never left its network and is frozen there. The other 12.9% went to the exchange MEXC, which froze the receiving account within about an hour.

Other exchanges have reacted too. Bitcoin.com reports that Bitget suspended QUBIC deposits and withdrawals for maintenance. It also says QU had fallen more than 10% by Sunday morning US Eastern time. Cointelegraph, citing CoinGecko, put the token's market capitalisation at about $62.6 million on 19 October.

How the recovery vote works

The Computors will decide whether victims get anything back. Qubic says its core team is working out which wallets were affected and drafting recovery options. The Computor quorum will then vote on them. Neither source describes what those options are, or what share of the vote is needed to approve one.

This is the part to watch. Because the chain is paused, the validators can choose how to treat tokens that are still on-chain. Reversing or redirecting transfers this way is something most large public blockchains avoid. The 12.9% at MEXC is a separate matter: getting it back depends on how the exchange handles the frozen account.

Qubic says it will publish a full technical report once a recovery plan is agreed. It has not said when the network will restart.

A recurring kind of failure

Weak seed generation has caused a string of losses. Cointelegraph notes that in July, Coldcard disclosed thefts from wallets whose seeds had been weakened by a firmware bug. Similar flaws hit Trust Wallet's browser extension and the Libbitcoin Explorer tool in 2023.

Most self-custody advice is about storing a seed: write it down, keep it offline, never share it. These cases show the other half of the risk. A seed kept perfectly safe is still exposed if an attacker can reproduce it from the software that made it.

The incident adds to a heavy year for security losses. Cointelegraph cites AMLBot's 2026 investigations report, which covered 250 cases. In the third quarter, hacks and exploits made up 19% of crypto crime cases but 40% of reported losses.

Background on Qubic

Qubic offers fee-free transactions and smart contracts. It runs on a consensus mechanism it calls Useful Proof of Work, which uses mining computation to train artificial intelligence. Its founder is Sergey Ivancheglo, known as "Come-from-Beyond," an early developer linked to NXT and IOTA.

The project made headlines in 2025, when it claimed majority control of Monero's mining hashrate. Blockchain reorganisations followed and alarmed the Monero community. This time the weakness was in Qubic's own wallet software.

What to watch

  • The Computor vote: which recovery options the core team puts forward, and whether victims are made whole, partly repaid or not compensated at all.
  • Network restart: no date has been announced. Until one is, QU holders cannot move tokens on-chain.
  • MEXC's frozen account: whether, and on what terms, the 12.9% held there is returned.
  • Exchange access: when Bitget resumes QUBIC deposits and withdrawals.
  • The technical report: Qubic has promised a full write-up after the recovery plan is settled. It should show how predictable the seeds were and whether any other wallets remain exposed.
  • User action: anyone whose Qubic seed came from an Apple browser, Safari on a Mac or the older iOS app should follow the project's official guidance. Qubic says the fix is in web wallet version 4.26.4.